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Abstract
This paper presents an agent-based model that studies the
emergence and evolution of a language system of logical con-
structions, i.e. a vocabulary and a set of grammatical con-
structions that allows the expression of logical combinations
of categories. The model assumes the agents have a com-
mon vocabulary for basic categories, the ability to construct
logical combinations of categories using Boolean functions,
and some general purpose cognitive capacities for invention,
adoption, induction and adaptation. But it does not assume
the agents have a vocabulary for Boolean functions nor gram-
matical constructions for expressing such logical combina-
tions of categories through language. The results of the ex-
periments we have performed show that a language system of
logical constructions emerges as a result of a process of self-
organisation of the individual agents’ interactions when these
agents adapt their preferences for vocabulary and grammat-
ical constructions to those they observe are used more often
by the rest of the population, and that such a language system
is transmitted from one generation to the next.
Content Areas: Cognitive Modeling, Symbolic AI, Simulat-
ing Humans, Adaptive Behavior
1 Introduction
Agent-based models, implemented and tested in computer
simulations, are one of the approaches that have been used
with increasing success to study issues in the origins and
evolution of language in the last two decades (Hurford,
Studdert-Kennedy, and Kight 1998; Briscoe 2002; Lyon,
Nehaniv, and Cangelosi 2007). Depending on whether the
designers of these models emphasise the role of biological
evolution (e.g. genetic evolution by natural selection) or the
role of cultural evolution, agent-based models can be classi-
fied into two areas: Biolinguistics, which hypothesises that
the structure of language is determined to a large extent by
biological factors (Di Sciullo and Boeckx 2011); and Evo-
lutionary Linguistics, which hypothesises that language is
primarily shaped by cultural forces (Minett and Wang 2005;
Croft 2008; Steels 2011b).
Agent-based models exploring the evolutionary linguis-
tics approach usually involve a population of artificial agents
which can be either software agents operating in a virtual
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world (Steels 1995; Smith, Brighton, and Kirby 2003) or
physical robots interacting with each other in a real world
as experienced by their sensory-motor system (Steels 1998).
The agents interact with each other playing language games.
A language game (Wittgenstein 1953) is played by two
agents, a speaker and a hearer. The speaker has a specific
communicative goal, conceptualises the world for language,
and transforms this conceptualisation into an utterance. The
hearer tries to parse the utterance, reconstruct its meaning
and map it into its own perceptual experience of the world.
Depending on the outcome of the game speaker and hearer
use different strategies to expand and adapt their internal lan-
guages to be more successful in future language games.
In these experiments, the agents are initially endowed
with a set of cognitive abilities that are hypothesised to be
necessary for seeing the emergence of language strategies to
be successful in a language game (Steels 2012). Then, they
are made to play a series of language games, where they
configure possible strategies and try them out. The goal of
the experiments is to find out whether the population as a
whole succeeds in the language game, i.e. communicates ef-
fectively, and to observe the conceptualisations and linguis-
tic constructions that emerge in the population as a result
of the processes of collective invention, negotiation and lan-
guage transmission across generations.
Theories of language evolution study language change at
two different levels: that of language systems and that of lan-
guage strategies. Language systems (also called paradigms)
capture the regularity observed in some part of the vocab-
ulary or grammar of a language, for example, a system of
colour terms, tense-aspect distinctions, cases or determin-
ers. Language systems group a set of paradigmatic choices
both on the side of meaning (the conceptual system) and
on the side of form (the linguistic system). The conceptual
system includes semantic distinctions that are expressible in
a language system and can therefore be used as building
blocks for conceptualisation. The linguistic system includes
the syntactic and morphological categories and grammati-
cal constructions necessary to turn a conceptualisation into
a concrete utterance. A given language comprises thousands
of language systems, which are closely integrated.
Linguists call the approach underlying a language sys-
tem a language strategy. They talk about relative-clause
formation strategies, coordination strategies (for combining
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nouns) or case strategies. Knowledge about a language strat-
egy requires both a semantic component for handling the
formation, learning and adaptation of the relevant concep-
tual system, and a linguistic component doing the same for
the related linguistic system (Steels 2011b).
Agent-based experiments in evolutionary linguistics aim
to explain how particular language systems may emerge and
evolve, assuming all the individuals in the population share
the same strategy. In the long term these experiments should
also be able to explain how new language strategies can
emerge and propagate in a population. But most work has
focused so far on the emergence of particular language sys-
tems, and on the study of the evolution over time of various
macroscopic properties of these language systems, such as
their effectiveness for communication, the average size of
the agents’ vocabularies or the similarity of the grammatical
constructions they use to express certain types of meanings.
Examples of language systems that have been studied us-
ing agent-based computer simulations are: (1) case systems
to express the role of participants in events (Steels 1998;
Batali 1998; van Trijp 2010); (2) vague context-dependent
quantifiers (e.g. many, some) (Pauw and Hilferty 2012); (3)
agreement markers as a way to group words together (Beuls
and Steels 2013); or (4) colour vocabularies in co-evolution
with colour categories (Steels and Belpaeme 2005).
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Firstly,
we explain what we mean by a language system of logi-
cal constructions and specify the set of logical categories the
agents can use to construct logical combinations of basic cat-
egories. Secondly, we introduce the formalism used to rep-
resent the agents’ grammars. Then, we describe the partic-
ular type of linguistic interaction that allows the population
to construct a shared lexicon and a grammar, focusing on
two important cognitive abilities: induction and adaptation.
Next, we present the results of some experiments in which a
population of autonomous agents constructs a language sys-
tem of logical constructions and transmits it to succeeding
generations. Finally, we discuss related work and summarise
the main contributions of the paper.
2 Logical Constructions
In this paper we focus on the study of the emergence and
evolution of a language system of logical constructions. We
consider a scenario in which a group of agents try to com-
municate about subsets of objects of the set of all the objects
in a given context. We assume the agents have developed al-
ready a common vocabulary for referring to some individual
object features, such as being up or to the left. These features
are represented by propositional symbols such as up or le
in the agents’ memories, and denote the propositions ‘I am
referring to the objects which are up’ and ‘I am referring to
the objects which are to the left’ respectively.
We also assume the agents have developed some logi-
cal categories which allow them to construct propositional
logic formulas from propositional symbols, although they
have not learnt yet to express these logical categories nor
the logical formulas they can construct with them in their
shared language. The agents are therefore able to construct
complex meanings, such as ‘I am referring to the objects
which are either up or to the left, but not both’, but they do
not know how to express such meanings through language.
The goal of the experiment is thus to show that a popula-
tion of autonomous agents with the characteristics we have
described above can construct a shared language (i.e. a vo-
cabulary and a set of grammatical constructions) that allows
them to communicate such complex meanings.
The particular set of logical categories the agents can use
to construct logical formulas is not the set of connectives
of propositional logic (i.e. ¬,∧,∨,→,↔), but the set of
unary and binary Boolean functions not, and, nand,
or, nor, if, nif, oif, noif, iff and xor.
The meaning of these functions, assuming they are ap-
plied to propositions A and B, can be expressed using the
five connectives of propositional logic as follows ¬A,A ∧
B,¬(A∧B), A∨B,¬(A∨B), A→ B,¬(A→ B), B →
A,¬(B → A), A ↔ B and (A ∨ B) ∧ ¬(A ∧ B) re-
spectively. However, the representation of their meaning as
propositional logic formulas which use only these five con-
nectives requires sometimes the use of more than one log-
ical connective in the same formula, as in [xor, up, le] ≡
(up∨le)∧¬(up∧le), and thus the ability to construct mean-
ings (formulas) with several levels of recursion, which is not
assumed in the present experiment1.
3 Agents’ Grammars
We use Prolog Grammar Rules (Colmerauer et al. 1972;
Pereira and Warren 1980) to represent the grammars con-
structed by the individual agents. The head of such rules is
an atomic formula whose predicate symbol denotes a syn-
tactic category (e.g. s for sentence) and whose arguments
specify a number of aspects of the phrase or constituent de-
scribed by that rule. In this paper we use two arguments. The
first argument conveys semantic information and the second
one a score in the interval [0,1] that estimates the usefulness
of that rule in previous communication. In our experiments,
semantic information can be a proposition, a Boolean func-
tion, or a non-recursive logical formula constructed from
the others. Logical formulas are represented using Lisp-like
(McCarthy 1960) prefix notation.
Let us consider some examples of grammars the agents
could use to express formula [and,le,up]. The first
grammar consists of a single rule which states that ‘izqyarr’
is a valid sentence meaning [and,le,up].
s([and, le, up]), S)→ izqyarr, {S is 0.1} (1)
The same formula could also be expressed by using the
following compositional grammar:
s(up, S)→ arr, {S is 0.70} (2)
s(le, S)→ izq, {S is 0.25} (3)
c2(and, S)→ y, {S is 0.50} (4)
s([P,Q,R], S)→ 2, c2(P, S1), s(Q,S2), s(R,S3),
{S is S1·S2·S3·0.1} (5)
1Formulas constructed with Boolean functions are written using
prefix notation, e.g. the list [iff,A,B] is equivalent to A↔ B.
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The number appearing in the first place on the right hand
side of some grammar rules (e.g. rule 5) indicates the po-
sition of the word associated with the Boolean function in
the sentence: 1 indicates that the word associated with the
Boolean function is placed in the first position, 2 in the sec-
ond position, and 3 in the third position. This convention is
necessary, because left recursive grammar rules cannot be
used in Prolog. So the actual sentence generated by the sec-
ond grammar is ‘2yizqarr’, which can be parsed into ‘izq-
yarr’. This grammar breaks down the sentence ‘izqyarr’ into
subparts with independent meanings and the whole sentence
is constructed by concatenating these subparts. The meaning
of the sentence is obtained by combining the meanings of its
subparts2, using variables P, Q and R.
4 Language Games
Language acquisition is seen in this paper as a collective
activity by which a group of autonomous agents construct a
common language system as a result of a self-organisation
process of the linguistic interactions that take place among
them. In our experiments the agents interact with each other
playing language games (Wittgenstein 1953). The particular
type of language game we use is played by two agents, a
speaker and a hearer, randomly chosen from the population.
The main steps of its algorithm are described in figure 1.
1. The speaker chooses a Boolean formula (i.e. a meaning)
from its set of conceptualisations of the subset of objects
that constitutes the topic of the language game, gener-
ates or invents a sentence that expresses this formula, and
communicates that sentence to the hearer.
2. The hearer tries to interpret the sentence communicated
by the speaker. If it can parse it using its lexicon and gram-
mar, it extracts a meaning (i.e. a Boolean formula). If the
hearer cannot parse the sentence, the speaker communi-
cates the Boolean formula it had in mind to the hearer,
and the hearer adopts an association between that formula
and the sentence used by the speaker.
3. Depending on the outcome of the language game speaker
and hearer expand and adapt their grammars to be more
successful in future language games.
A language game is considered successful if the hearer
can parse the sentence communicated by the speaker and
if its interpretation of that sentence is a Boolean formula
which is logically equivalent to the formula the speaker had
in mind; otherwise, the language game fails.
4.1 Generation and Invention
At the early stages of a simulation run the agents cannot
use their internal grammars to generate sentences for most
meanings, because they all start with a common lexicon for
basic categories, but no grammar rules. In order to let lan-
guage get off the ground, the agents are allowed to invent
new sentences for those meanings they cannot express using
their grammars.
2Note that in Prolog variables start with capital letters and con-
stants with lower case.
function GENERATE(Agent,Meaning) returns Sentence,
CompetingSentences
Sentence is one of the sentences with highest score
Agent can generate to express Meaning. The rest of
the sentences are CompetingSentences.
function INTERPRET(Agent,Sentence) returns Meaning,
CompetingMeanings
Meaning is one of the meanings (formulas) with
highest score Agent can obtain parsing Sentence.
The rest of the meanings are CompetingMeanings.
procedure LANGUAGE GAME(Speaker, Topic, Hearer)
Speaker chooses Meaning from CONCEP(Speaker,Topic)
Ss,CSs ←− GENERATE(Speaker, Meaning)
if {Ss}
⋃
CSs 6=∅ then Speaker communicates Ss to Hearer
else
Speaker cannot generate a sentence to express Meaning
Ss ←− INVENT(Speaker, Meaning)
ADOPT ASSOCIATION(Speaker, Meaning, Ss)
Speaker communicates Ss to Hearer
Mh,CMh ←− INTERPRET(Hearer, Ss)
if {Mh}
⋃
CMh 6= ∅ then
if Meaning is logically equivalent to Mh then
the language game succeeds
else the language game fails
Speaker communicates Meaning to Hearer
ADAPT(Hearer, Ss, Meaning, Mh,CMh)
else
Hearer cannot parse sentence Ss, language game fails
Speaker communicates Meaning to Hearer
ADOPT ASSOCIATION(Hearer, Meaning, Ss)
Figure 1: Algorithm of the language game used in the model.
A new sentence E for a formula F is invented as follows.
If F is atomic, invention is not necessary because there exists
a word in the common lexicon that expresses F. New words
are generated for logical categories (i.e. Boolean functions
of one or two arguments) as sequences of three to six letters
randomly chosen from the alphabet. If F is a non-recursive
Boolean formula such as [not, A] or [⊗, A, B], a
word is generated for each propositional symbol using the
common lexicon, a new word is invented for the Boolean
function, and the two or three words generated (depending
on the type of formula) are concatenated in random order.
As the agents play language games, they learn associa-
tions between expressions and meanings, and induce lin-
guistic knowledge from such associations in the form of
grammar rules and lexical entries. Once they can generate a
sentence to express a particular meaning using their gram-
mars, they do not keep inventing new sentences. Instead,
they select the sentence with the highest score from the set of
all the sentences they can generate to express that meaning,
and communicate that sentence to the hearer.
The score of a sentence (or a meaning) generated using
a compositional grammar rule is computed using the arith-
metic expression on the right hand side of that rule (Vogt
2005). Consider the generation of sentence ‘izqyarr’ for ex-
pressing meaning [and,le,up] using rules 2, 3, 4 and 5.
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The score S = 0.00875 of sentence ‘izqyarr’, generated by
rule 5, is computed multiplying the score of that rule (0.1)
by the scores of rules 2, 3 and 4, which generate the words
associated with the constituents of that sentence (0.70, 0.25
and 0.50, respectively). The score of a grammar rule is the
last number in the arithmetic expression that appears on the
right hand side of that rule.
4.2 Interpretation and Adoption
In the second step of a language game the hearer tries to in-
terpret the sentence communicated by the speaker using its
own grammar. However, at the early stages of a simulation
run the agents cannot parse most of the sentences communi-
cated by the speakers, because they start with a common lex-
icon for basic categories but no grammar rules. In this case
the speaker communicates the formula (meaning) F it had in
mind to the hearer, and the hearer adopts an association be-
tween that formula and the sentence E used by the speaker,
adding a new rule of the form s(F, S) → E, {S is 0.1} to
its grammar. The scores of the rules invented or adopted by
the agents are given an initial value of 0.1.
Invention and adoption allow thus the agents to construct
and learn associations between sentences and meanings.
From these associations they induce linguistic knowledge,
i.e. grammatical constructions and lexical entries, they in-
corporate to their grammars and use in subsequent language
games to generate and interpret other sentences.
Once the agents can interpret a sentence using their own
grammar, they select the meaning (formula) with the high-
est score from the set of all the meanings they can obtain
for that sentence. However, at halfway stages of a simula-
tion run the grammars of speaker and hearer are often not
compatible, and the interpretation chosen by the hearer is
not logically equivalent to meaning the speaker had in mind.
The reason for this is that each agent constructs its inter-
nal language from the linguistic interactions it participates
in, and speaker and hearer never share the same history of
linguistic interactions unless the population consists only of
these two agents. The strategy used to coordinate the gram-
mars of speaker and hearer when this happens is to decrease
the scores of the rules used by the hearer to obtain its inter-
pretation of the sentence communicated by the speaker.
4.3 Induction
As mentioned above the agents extract generalisations in the
form of grammar rules and lexical entries from the associa-
tions between sentences and meanings they invent or adopt
from other agents. The induction rules used in the experi-
ment are the rules simplification and chunk in (Kirby 2002).
Induction is applied whenever the agents invent or adopt an
association between a sentence and a meaning, to avoid re-
dundancy and increase generality in their grammars.
Simplification Let r1 and r2 be a pair of grammar rules
such that the semantic argument of the left hand side of
r1 contains a subterm m1, r2 is of the form n(m1, S) →
e1, {S is C1}, and e1 is a substring of the terminals of
r1. Then simplification can be applied to r1 replacing it
with a new rule that is identical to r1 except that: (1) m1
is replaced with a new variable X in the semantic argu-
ment of the left hand side; (2) e1 is replaced with n(X,S)
on the right hand side; and (3) the arithmetic expression
{R is E·C2} on the right hand side of r1 is replaced with an
arithmetic expression of the form {R is E · S · 0.1}, where
C1 and C2 are constants in the range [0,1], and E is the
product of the score variables on the right hand side of r1.
Let us see an example of how simplification works. Sup-
pose an agent’s grammar contains rules 2 and 3. It plays a
language game, and invents or adopts the following rule.
s([and, le, up], S)→ izqyarr, {S is 0.1}. (6)
It could apply simplification to rule 6 (using rule 2) and
replace it with 7.
s([and, le, R], S)→ izqy, s(R,SR), {S is SR · 0.1} (7)
Now rule 7 could be simplified again (using rule 3), re-
placing it with rule 8, which contains specific information
about the word ‘y’ associated with Boolean function and,
the position of such word in the sentence (2nd), and the rela-
tive positions of the words associated with the arguments of
Boolean function and in the sentence (not inverted3).
s([and,Q,R], S)→ 2, y, s(Q,SQ), s(R,SR),
{S is SQ · SR · 0.1} (8)
If the agent invents or adopts a rule that associates sen-
tence ‘izqoarr’ with formula [or,le,up] and applies simplifi-
cation, then its grammar would contain the following rule.
s([or,Q,R], S)→ 2, o, s(Q,SQ), s(R,SR),
{S is SQ · SR · 0.1} (9)
Chunk I Let r1 and r2 be a pair of rules with the same
left hand side category symbol. If the semantic arguments
of the left hand sides of the rules differ only in one subterm
m1 and m2, and there exist two strings of terminals e1 and
e2 that, if replaced with the same non-terminal, would make
the right hand sides of the rules identical, then chunk can be
applied as follows. A new category symbol c is created and
the following new rules are added to the grammar.
c(m1, S)→ e1,{S is 0.1} c(m2, S)→ e2,{S is 0.1}
Rules r1 and r2 are replaced with a single rule that is
identical to r1 except that: (1) m1 is replaced with a new
variable X in the semantic argument of the left hand side;
(2) e1 is replaced with c(X,S) on the right hand side; and
(3) the arithmetic expression {R is E · C1} on the right
hand side of r1 is replaced with a new arithmetic expression
of the form {R is E · S · 0.1}, where C1 is a constant in the
range [0,1] and E is the product of the score variables that
appeared on the right hand side of r1.
The agent could now apply chunk I to rules 8 and 9 gen-
erating a syntactic category c2 for binary Boolean functions.
s([P,Q,R], S)→ 2, c2(P, S1), s(Q,S2), s(R,S3),
{S is S1·S2·S3·0.1} (10)
3Rule s([and,Q,R],S)→2,y,s(R,SR),s(Q,SQ), {S is SR·SQ·0.1}
that generates sentence ‘arryizq’ to express [and,le,up], in-
stead of sentence ‘izqyarr’, inverts the order of the arguments.
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c2(and, S)→ y, {S is 0.1} (11)
c2(or, S)→ o, {S is 0.1} (12)
Rules 8 and 9 would be replaced with rule 10, which
can be applied to formulas constructed with other binary
Boolean functions, and rules 11 and 12, which state that
words ‘y’ and ‘o’ mean ‘and’ and ‘or’, and belong to syn-
tactic category c2, would be added to the grammar.
Chunk II If the semantic arguments of the left hand sides
of two rules r1 and r2 can be unified applying substitution
X/m1 to r1, and there is a string of terminals e1 in r2 that
corresponds to c(X,S) in r1, then rule r2 can be replaced
with a new rule of the form c(m1, S)→ e1, {S is 0.01}.
Suppose the agent adopts or invents the following rule.
s([if, le, up], S)→ izqsiarr, {S is 0.1} (13)
Simplification of 13, 2, 3 would replace rule 13 with 14.
s([if, Q,R], S)→ 2, si, s(Q,SQ), s(R,SR),
{S is SQ·SR·0.1} (14)
Chunk II, applied to 14 and 10, would replace 14 with 15.
c2(if, S)→ si, {S is 0.1} (15)
4.4 Adaptation
Coordination of the agents’ grammars is necessary, because
different agents can invent different words to refer to the
same Boolean function and they may concatenate the words
associated with the components of a Boolean formula in dif-
ferent orders when they try to express it as a sentence. In the
experiments discussed in this paper coordination is achieved
through a process of self-organisation of the agents’ linguis-
tic interactions that takes place when these agents adapt their
preferences for vocabulary and grammatical constructions to
those they observe are used more often by other agents.
The agents adapt the scores of their grammar rules (i.e.
their preferences for vocabulary and grammatical construc-
tions) at the last step of a language game, when the speaker
communicates the meaning it had in mind to the hearer, and
only in the case in which the speaker can generate at least
one sentence for the meaning it is trying to communicate us-
ing its grammar and the hearer can parse the sentence com-
municated by the speaker. In a language game only the agent
playing the role of hearer adapts the scores of its grammar
rules. However, as all the agents in the population play both
the role of speaker and that of hearer in different language
games, all the agents have plenty of oppotunities to adapt the
scores of their grammar rules during a simulation run.
The procedure for adapting the scores of the hearer’s
grammar rules is sketched in figure 2. It assumes that: (1)
the speaker has communicated to the hearer a sentence Ss;
(2) the hearer has been able to parse Ss, obtaining a meaning
Mh with highest score and a possibly non-empty set of al-
ternative meanings CMh called competing meanings; and (3)
the speaker has communicated to the hearer a formula Mean-
ing that represents the meaning the speaker had in mind.
If the meaning interpreted by the hearer is logically equiv-
alent to the meaning the speaker had in mind, the game suc-
ceeds. The hearer takes this interaction as a positive example
function RULES G(Agent, Meaning, Sent) returns Rules
Rules are the grammar rules used by Agent to generate
sentence Sent in order to express Meaning.
function RULES I(Agent, Sent, Meaning) returns Rules
Rules are the grammar rules used by Agent to obtain
Meaning parsing sentence Sent.
procedure ADAPT(Hearer, Ss, Meaning, Mh,CMh)
Ss is the sentence communicated by the speaker
Meaning is the meaning the speaker had in mind
Mh is the meaning chosen by the hearer
if Meaning is logically equivalent to Mh then
The language game succeeds
Hearer adjusts scores at the level of interpretation
Rhi ←− RULES I(Hearer, Ss,Mh)
INCREASE SCORES(Hearer, Rhi)
for each M in CMh do
RM ←− RULES I(Hearer, Ss,M )
DECREASE SCORES(Hearer, (RM \Rhi))
end
Hearer adjusts scores at the level of generation
Sh,CSh ←− GENERATE(Hearer, Meaning)
if Ss ∈ {Sh}
⋃
CSh then
Rhg ←− RULES G(Hearer, Meaning, Ss)
INCREASE SCORES(Hearer,Rhg)
for each S in ({Sh}
⋃
CSh) \ {Ss} do
RS ←− RULES G(Hearer, Meaning, S)
DECREASE SCORES(Hearer, (RS \Rhg))
end
else
The language game fails
Rhi ←− RULES I(Hearer, Ss,Mh)
DECREASE SCORES(Hearer, Rhi)
Figure 2: Algorithm for adapting the scores of the hearer’s
grammar rules. The score of each grammar rule is adjusted
only once, even if it is used for generating or obtaining more
than one sentence or more than one meaning. Set difference,
RM \Rhi orRS \Rhg , is used to avoid decreasing scores of
rules used for obtaining the speaker’s meaning or sentence.
and adjusts the scores of its grammar rules both at the level
of interpretation and at that of generation. First, the hearer
increases the scores of the rules it used for obtaining the
meaning the speaker had in mind and decreases the scores
of the rules it used for obtaining competing meanings. Then,
the hearer tries to simulate what it would have said if it were
in the speaker’s place: it tries to express the meaning the
speaker had in mind using its own grammar, and it increases
the scores of the grammar rules that generate the sentence
that was chosen by the speaker and decreases the scores of
the rules that generate competing sentences.
Adjusting scores at the level of interpretation means de-
creasing the scores of associations between the sentence
used by the speaker and ‘competing meanings’. This re-
duces ambiguity by discouraging a phenomenon similar to
homonymy but happening at sentence level. Adjusting the
scores at the level of generation means decreasing the scores
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Figure 3: Evolution of communicative success, coherence,
invention and adoption in an experiment with a population of
ten agents playing 6060 language games. The results are the
average of ten simulation runs with different random seeds.
of associations between the meaning the speaker had in mind
and ‘competing sentences’ the hearer could use for express-
ing that meaning. This reduces ambiguity by discouraging a
phenomenon similar to synonymy but happening at sentence
level. The scores of the rules used by the hearer to obtain the
meaning the speaker had in mind are increased only once.
If the meaning interpreted by the hearer is not logically
equivalent to the meaning the speaker had in mind, the game
fails, and the hearer decreases the scores of the rules it used
for interpreting the sentence communicated by the speaker.
The scores of grammar rules are updated using the fol-
lowing formulas with alignment rate µ = 0.1. The rule’s
original score S is replaced with the result of evaluating ex-
pression 16 if the score is increased, and with the result of
evaluating expression 17 if the score is decreased.
S · (1− µ) + µ (16)
S · (1− µ) (17)
5 Experiments
The agent-based model described in this paper has been im-
plemented in Prolog (Bueno et al. 1997) and tested conduct-
ing a series of experiments that study both the emergence
of a shared language system of logical constructions and its
transmission from one generation to the next.
In the first experiment, which studies language emer-
gence, the agents start with a common lexicon for six ba-
sic categories but no grammar rules. Then they play 6060
language games about logical formulas constructed apply-
ing unary and binary Boolean functions to basic categories.
Figure 3 shows the evolution over time4 of four measures
which monitor the population’s global performance. Com-
municative success is the average of successful language
games in the last ten games played by the agents. The popu-
lation reaches full communicative success (i.e. 1.0) in 1950
language games, i.e. after each agent has played 390 games.
Coherence measures the similarity of the agents’ grammars.
It is the average of language games in which: (1) the hearer
understands correctly the sentence communicated by the
4Each point on the x-axes of figures 3, 4 and 5 represents ten
consecutive language games in the simulation.
speaker, and (2) the hearer would use the same sentence
as the sentence used by the speaker to communicate the
meaning the speaker had in mind. Coherence increases more
slowly than communicative success. Full coherence (1.0) is
reached in 4600 games (i.e. 920 games per agent).
Invention (respectively adoption) is the number of sen-
tences invented (respectively adopted) by an agent in past
language games. The data shown in figure 3 are the aver-
age values of invention (adoption) for a population of ten
agents in ten simulation runs5. As it can be observed, in-
vention grows relatively rapidly during the first 550 games,
reaching a maximum average value of 5.14 inventions per
agent. At that point the agents must have learnt all the vo-
cabulary and grammatical constructions required to express
logical formulas constructed with unary and binary Boolean
functions. The average number of sentences adopted by the
agents keeps growing during the first 1900 games, reaching
a maximum average value of 31.03 adoptions per agent. At
that point the agents must have learnt the vocabulary and
grammatical constructions used by the other agents.
Figure 4: Evolution of communicative success, coherence,
invention and adoption in an experiment studying language
transmission with a population of ten agents playing 6060
language games. The data shown in the graph are the average
of ten simulation runs with different initial random seeds.
Figure 4 shows the results of an experiment studying lan-
guage transmission across generations. The agents in the
population are divided into three groups: the elder, the adults
and the young. Every 500 games the elder (approximately
one third of the population) are replaced with new agents
which have neither a vocabulary for Boolean functions nor
grammar rules. The previous adults become the elder, the
young the adults, and the new ones the younger genera-
tion. As a consequence the population is completely re-
newed after 1500 games. Every time new agents are intro-
duced the four measures decrease, but they catch up be-
fore the next generation of agents is introduced. Commu-
nicative success typically reaches values over 0.96, which
dip to 0.50 when new agents are introduced. Coherence fol-
lows closely communicative success, reaching values over
0.94. The final average value of inventions per agent (5.36)
5The same number of simulation runs is used in language emer-
gence and evolution studies such as (Vogt 2005) and (Kirby 2002).
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Figure 5: Average score evolution of constructions express-
ing exclusive disjunction (xor) in one simulation run of the
experiment studying language transmission. Once construc-
tion [1,I,s,w,m,r,c] is established as the preferred way to ex-
press exclusive disjunction in the second generation, it is
transmitted without change to succeeding generations.
is slightly larger than in the experiment with a single genera-
tion (5.14). Adoption, however, reaches a smaller final aver-
age value (20.95) than in the experiment with a single gener-
ation (31.03). This is due to the fact that new agents learn a
language already established in the population (i.e. the lan-
guage that is transmitted from generation to generation in
the experiment), which uses fewer variations –typically one
or two– for expressing a given meaning. Whereas agents cre-
ated in the first stages of the experiment must learn all the
constructions invented by the rest of the population.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the scores of the twenty
nine constructions invented by the agents to express exclu-
sive disjunction (xor) in one simulation run of the experi-
ment studying language transmission. Each line in the graph
displays the evolution of the average score of one partic-
ular construction for the ten agents in the population. For
readability reasons we have labelled only five of the twenty
nine lines shown in the graph. These correspond to some
constructions that have had a significant average score for
some relatively long period of time during the simulation.
Constructions are labelled with the word used to express
Boolean function xor in that particular construction, pre-
ceded by a number which indicates the position of that word
in the sentence, and by the letter ‘I’ if the construction in-
verts the order of the words associated with the arguments
of xor in the sentence or by the letter ‘N’ if it does not in-
vert them. As it can be observed the agents use constructions
which associate different words with Boolean function xor,
place these words in the first, second or third position of the
sentence, and invert (e.g. [2,I,v,m,p,r,w,e]) or do not invert
(e.g. [2,N,p,r,l,f,p]) the order of the words associated with
the arguments of xor in the sentence. However, once con-
struction [1,I,s,w,m,r,c] begins to be preferred by the agents
in the second generation (after the first 750 games), its av-
erage score keeps dominating the scores of the other con-
structions in succeeding generations, although it decreases
every time new agents are introduced in the population. This
means that this construction is transmitted without change
from the second generation to the last one in the experiment.
6 Contributions and Related Work
This paper has used an agent-based model to study the
emergence and evolution of a language system of logical
constructions. The model has been implemented in Prolog
and it has been tested conducting a series of experiments
which simulate a scenario where a group of autonomous
agents try to communicate about subsets of objects char-
acterised by logical combinations of basic categories. The
results of these experiments show that a shared vocabulary
for Boolean functions and a set of grammatical construc-
tions (which use word order to express the relation between
Boolean functions and their arguments in a sentence) emerge
as a result of a process of self-organisation of the agents’
interactions when these agents adapt their preferences for
vocabulary and grammatical constructions to those they ob-
serve are used more often by other agents. And they also
show that the same invention, adoption, induction and adap-
tation mechanisms that allow a group of agents to construct
a shared language system of logical constructions enable the
transmission of such a language system from one generation
to succeeding ones in the experiments.
Within the evolutionary linguistics literature, the work
presented in this paper belongs to the set of experiments
that study grammar acquisition (Batali 1998; Steels 1998;
Kirby 2002; Smith, Brighton, and Kirby 2003) rather than
lexicon acquisition (Steels 1995; Lara and Alfonseca 2000;
2002; Steels and Belpaeme 2005). Word order plays a cru-
cial role in our experiments, because the position of each
subexpression in a sentence determines how it is semanti-
cally related to the rest of subexpressions: whether it names
a proposition or a Boolean function, or whether it is the first
or the second argument of a Boolean function (e.g. the an-
tecedent or the consequent of an implication). (Steels 1998)
and (Kirby 2002) also study the emergence of word-order
based grammar. But they do not address the issue of nego-
tiation, because the populations in these works consist only
of two agents. In our experiments, however, the population
consists of ten agents, that need to agree on how to order the
expressions associated with the constituents of each differ-
ent type of Boolean formula to construct a sentence. There
are eleven types of Boolean formulas and six possible or-
derings for each (except for negation, which has only two
possible orderings). And they also need to agree on how to
name eleven Boolean functions.
Our work also differs from (Kirby 2002) in testing com-
municative success using logical equivalence of formulas
(meanings), rather than syntactic equality. This is reflected
in the language systems constructed by the agents in our ex-
periments, which may use a single word for referring to dif-
ferent Boolean functions if these Boolean functions have re-
dundant semantics, and which do not always impose a strict
word-order between the expressions associated with the ar-
guments of commutative Boolean functions.
(Beuls and Steels 2013) and (van Trijp 2010) also study
grammar acquisition, but they use agreement and case mark-
ers (i.e. suffixes attached to words) instead of word order
as the syntactic means for semantic disambiguation. They
also use simulations with software agents (rather than ex-
periments with physical robots interacting with each other
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in a real world environment), initialise the agents with a pre-
defined vocabulary for basic properties, and use a language
game in which the topic consists of several objects. How-
ever, their agents conceptualise the topic using a set of dis-
tinctive properties in which each property refers to a sin-
gle object of the topic, and the role of agreement (respec-
tively case) markers is to indicate which properties of the
distinctive set refer to the same object (or which properties
of the distinctive set refer to the same role for case mark-
ers). Therefore, the set of meanings the agents can construct
in these works, and in (Vogt 2005), are only conjunctions of
basic properties. In our experiments, in contrast, the agents
conceptualise the topic constructing a discriminating logi-
cal formula, which can be a composition of basic proper-
ties through conjunction, disjunction, negation or any other
Boolean function, and which is true for every object in the
topic and false for the rest of the objects in the context.
Finally in order to conduct the experiments presented in
this paper, we have implemented a set of software tools that
allow performing language evolution experiments in Prolog.
These tools are different from the Lisp simulation and gram-
mar processing systems (Steels 2011a) used in other experi-
ments (van Trijp 2010; Steels 2012; Beuls and Steels 2013),
but can also be combined in interesting ways with them.
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